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We introduce and discuss a notion of strictly arithmetical completeness r&ted 10 relative 
compl&zness of Cook ( 1978) and arithmetical completeness of Hare1 (1978). We present a powerful 
technique of obtaining strictly arithmetical axiomatizations of logics of programs. Given a model- 
theoretic semantics of’ a logic and a set of formulae defining (in a metalanguagei its nonclassical 
connectives, we automatically derive strictly arithmetically complete and sound proof systems for 
this logic. As examples of applicdion of the technique we obtain new aGomatiz.ations ofalgorith- 
mic logic, (concurrent) dynamic logic and :empozd logic. 
1. Introduction 
The current paper is devoted to axiomatizing logics of programs. Such logics play 
a similar role in computer science to that of the classical logic in “pure” mathematics. 
Classical formulae, however, mirror the static nature of mathematic notions. On the 
other hand, dynamic behaviour of programs requires another approach. Currently, 
in general, researchers agree that the dynamic character of phenomena appearing 
in most areas of computer science have their conmerparts in nonclassical Iogics. 
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The history of development of logics of programs was initiated in the iate sixties 
and may seem a rather short one. Nevertheless the research on logics of programs 
was very intensive. Many logics have been delined and investigated. They were 
strongly influenced by the development of new programming tools for expanding 
applications of computers, and by essential progress in programming methodology. 
The explosion of various applications of computers resulted in deveiopment of 
many new programming concepts. Over fifteen-hundred different programming 
languages have been defined. They were usually accompanied by less or more 
suitable axiom systems for proving correctness of programs. Thus one of the major 
trends in the area of logics of programs concerns proof systems that enable formal 
reasoning about program properties. 
First-order logics of programs that are intended to express at least the most basic 
properties of programs as e.g. halting property, cannot be characterized completely 
(in the classical sense) by finitistic proof systems (cf. e.g. [i, 3, 5, 13, 151). On the 
other hand, in order to stay within a finitary framework, one can try to weaken 
classical notions of completeness. Various nonclassical notions of completeness 
were defined and new completeness proving techniques were developed (cf. e.g. [2, 
4, 5, 141). The most widely accepted nonclassical notion of completeness is that of 
relative completeness defined by Cook [4]. He separated the reasoning about 
programs from reasoning about first-order properti es af the underlying interpreta- 
tion, and proved that the famous Hoare system for proving partial correctness of 
programs is complete relative to the class of expressive interpretations. Arithmetica! 
completeness was derived from relative completeness by Hare1 I51 in his works on 
dynamic logic. Hare1 restricts the cla>s of admissible interpretations to those contain- 
ing the arithmetics of natural numbers. The notion of arithmetical completeness 
was adapted to the case of temporal logic in [14]. 
In the current paper we introduce a notion of strictly arithmetical (s-arithmetical, 
in short) completeness and show that the task of finding s-arithmetically complete 
axiomatizations for a wide class of logics of programs can be reduced to a few 
typical steps. S-arithmetical completeness differs from arithmetical completeness in 
its definition of the class of admissible interpretations. We discuss this more precisely 
in Section 3. 
By logic we shalt mean in this paper a set of well-formed formulae together with 
the class of admissible interpretations and a satistiability relation. We demand that 
the logic is an extension of classical first-order logic, and has model-theoretic 
semantics. We consider a class of logics with nonclassical connectives definable at 
a metalevel by infinite disjunctions (thus, by duality, conjunctions) of formulae. 
Such a basic characterization is essential in our investigations. However, due to the 
nature of computations performed by computers, most reasonable constructs can 
be characterized by the infinite operations we deal with. Consequently, the method 
presented in our paper is applicable to a large class of logics of programs. For 
instance, as we show in our examples (Section 2), algorithmic logic, (concurrent) 
dynamic logic and temporal logic fall into this class. 
2. Logic.9 of programs 
First let us establish the logicai framework assumed in our paper. By M we shall 
denote an enumerable set of nonclassical connectives. We assume that the con- 
nectives are “nary. We shall show, however, how to deal with nonclassical con- 
nectives that have more than one argument (cf. the atnext operator in temporal 
logic). In the sequel we shall always assume that a first-order signature is fixed. by 
L we shall then denote the set of many-sorted classical first-order formulae. 
Definition 2.1. Let M be an enumerable set of nonclassical connectives. We form 
an M-extension qf classical Jirst-order logic (M-logic, in short) as the triple 
(L(M), C. b), where 
(a) L(M) is the set of formulae obtained from L augmented with the following 
syntax rules: 
- LcL(M), 
- for aiiy iii C .V and A, L(M), n:(A) E L(M); 
(b) C is a class of admissible interpretations (we assume C is a subclass of 
classical first-order interpretations in relational structures); 
(c) C is a satisfiability relation that agrees with the classical one for classical 
first-order formulae (for I E C, A E L(M) and a valuation n of free variables, 
I, v != A, means that A is satisfied by interpretation I and valuation u). 
It should be remarked here that relational struc:ures are the only admissible 
interpretations considered in the above definition. This follows from two basic 
reasons. First, data types used by programmers in practice can always be described 
by relational structures. Second, such an assumption allows us to treat different 
logics in a uniform framework. 
Below we shall discuss case studies in Iogics of programs. The notion of proof 
systems for logics of programs will be discussed later (Section 3). Let us only remark 
here that searching for [arithmetically) complete proofsystems for Iogics of programs 
was usually considered a difficult task, all the more since each of those logics seemed 
considerably different from other logics and thus it seemed necessary to develop 
new techniques of proving completeness theorems. The main motivation of the case 
studies discussed below is then to show that from a certain point of view logics of 
programs are very close to each other. 
In definitions of Iogics of programs we consider only the most important parts 
of the Iogics. We also reformulate the original definitions of semantics, in order to 
stay within the framework described above. 
Definition 2.2. By algorithmic logic (AL) we shall mean the M.,,,-logic satisfying the 
following conditions (cf. e.g. [3, II]): 
(a) set ,%f,,,. *:ont:tins connectives of the form [PI and [IJ P], where P is a 
program, i.e. an expression dclined inductively as follows: 
_ i:= I is a program, where z is a variable, and I is a term, 
- P;Q and if G then P ti are programs, where P and Q are programs, and 
G is an open formula; 
(b) the class of admissible interpretations is the class of classical first-order 
interpretations; 
(c) the satisfiability relation of AL, C,,,, is defined as follows: 
- for classical connectives and first-order quantifiers kAL agrees with the 
satisliability relation of classical first-order logic, 
- I,u~,,~[-I:= t]A iff I,uC,,A(z/t), where AEL and A(z/t) means the 
formula obtained from A by replacing z by i renaming the free variables 
of t which are bound in A if ncccssary. 
- 1,~ kAL CRQIA iff 0 k.4,. [f’I([QIAL 
- I,uC,,[if G then P fi]A iff I,uC,,,(C+[P]A)A(TG+A), 
- I,v bAL [LJ P]A iff there is i E w such that I,c t,,L [P’] 4; where [P’JA = A, 
and [P’+‘]A = [P][P’]A. 
We shall say that interpretation I is an AL-model for a formula A E L(XA,), and 
denote this by I knL A, iff for any valuation u of free variables, I,v C,, A. 
Definition 2.3. By dynamic logic (DL) we shall mean the Mb,_-logic satisfying the 
following conditions (cf. e.g. [S j): 
(a) set MDL contains connectives of the form (pi, where P is a program, i.e. an 
expression defined inductively as follows: 
- z:= t is a program, where z is a variable and t is a term, 
- G? is a program, whets G is an open formula, 
- P;Q, Pu Q, P* are programs, where P and Q are programs; 
(b) the class of admissible interpretations is the class of classical first-order 
interpretations; 
(c) the satisfiabiiity re!ation of DL, !=oL. is defined as follows: 
- for classical connectives and first-order quantifiers kDL agrees with the 
satisfiability relation of classical first-order logic, 
- I,v Co,(z:= ?)A iff I,v C,,A(z/t), where AE L and A(z/t) is delined in 
Definition 2.2, 
- I,v~,,(G?)Aiff I,vC,,G/rA, 
- 0 ~L(P;Q)A iff IT b. (p)((Q)A), 
- I,v b_(Pu Q)A iff I,u boL(P)A or I,u k,,(Q)A, 
- I,v t,, (P*)A iff there is i E o such that I,u bDL (P’)A. 
We shall say that I is a DL-model fcr a formula AE L(MDL), and denote this by 
I Co, A, iff for any valuation V, I,v CD, A. 
Note that the main difference between AL and DL is.:hat AL concerns determinis- 
tic programs, whilst DL also contains nondeterministic ones (due to program 
connectives u and *). Consequently, ( ) means modal possibility (cf. [5]). 
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Delinition 2.4. By coneurrenf dynamic logic (CDL) we shall mean DL augmented 
with additional program connective n, and the following rule concerning its seman- 
tics (cf. e.g. [12]): 
1,~ bcDL(P~ Q)A iff I,u bcDL<P).4 and I,v kcnL(Q)A. 
We shall say that I is a CDL-model for a form& A s L(M,,,), and denote this 
by I c,,, A, iff for any valuation u, I,v !=cDL A. 
The last logic to be defined in this section is temporal logic (TL). The version of 
TL we consider deals with linear and di screte time, points of which correspond to 
elements of w. Usually the semantics of TL is given by means of Kripke structures 
of the form (I$), where I is a first-order interpretation, and S is a sequence of 
states, S= (.Q)~_. Each state assigns values to so-called local variables (cf. e.g. 
[9,10]). In order to stay within the framework of relational structures we shall 
“encode” the sequence of states by adding new constants to the first-order interpreta- 
tion. Let us describe the encoding more precisely. Assume Z=(Z,}~,, is a set of 
local variables. A Kripke structure (I,$ will be “encoded” by a relational structure 
which results from I by adding fresh constants {c, ji.jiw _ Since tf.e thus obtained 
‘ re!ational structure has to -:e _ er information about the sequence of states, we shall 
assume the following interpretation of new CGI jtants: the value of c# in 1 is equal 
to sj(zj). &viousijr, ioc2l variabies have to be eiiminated from the language. In 
order to put the above encoding into good use, we shall assume that every local 
-“a&h; I z_, ;s lqAhC__ . . -A % tS.e language bv a constant symbol ca;. 
Now we are ready to define TL. 
Definition 2.5. By femporol fogic (TL) we shall mean the Mr,-logic satisfying the 
following conditions (cf. e.g. [9]): 
(a) set ~r,=lJ,,_ M$,! where M”’ - TL {atoextBj5 is a classical first-order for- 
mula} and My:“= MyLu {atnextsi BE L(M$}; 
(b) the class of admissible interpretations is the class of classical first-order 
interpretations, constants of which contain {c,~},_,,: 
(c) tbe satisfiability relation of TL, & is defined as follo~ws: 
- for classical first-order formulae t TL agrees with the satisiiabilitj; d&on 
of classical first-order logic, 
- I,v i==TL A atnext, iff there exists i E o -10) such that I,u +tc (A n 5)! i, and 
for all O< j < f, f,u t,, 781 j, where by Aik we mean the formula obrained 
from A by replacing all occurrences of c, (i, jE o) by c._+~. 
We shall say that I is a IL-model for a formula 4~ L(M& and denote this by 
I & A, itI for any valuation u, and any i E o, I,r + Afi. 
Note that operators atnextB correspond to the strong abext operator of Kriiger 
(cf. [9]). In fact A rtoext, means A atoext 5. We introduced infinitely many operators 
A atnext” since the non-classical connectives we consider are one-argument ones. 
Note also, that we use so-called normal semantics of TL in the above definition. 
From the above definitions we can easily prove the following fact. 
Fact 2.6. For any first-order interpretation I and valuation v of j?ee variables the 
,folIowing conditions hold: 
(a) i,uc,,iU P]AeAv[P][G PjA, 
(b) 0 Ccc,m.(P*)A-Av (P)(P*)A, 
(cj 1,~ kr,. A atnext,o(A A B) i 1 v (TB A A atnext,) ( 1. 
Fact 2.6 points out the most essential characterization of nonclassical connectives 
in the considered logics of programs. Namely, the equivalences given in Fact 2.6 
have the following common form: 
where T(x) is defined as T(x) = A v [P]x, T(x) = A v (P)x, T(x) = (A A B) 1 1 v 
(TB A x) ) 1 for AL, (C)DL and TL respectively. In fact, every formula is defined 
by its own functional r To indicate this fact we shall denote the functional by r 
with its respective formttla as index; e.g., 
r[u~,n(x) = A v [Plx, &4x) = A v 0% 
l- ~atnexr.Jx) = (A A B) 1 1 v C-AX) 1 1 
Let zs i;-sin: stlt here that, from a syntactic point of view, functionals lead from 
respective sets of fornulae to themselves. From a semantic point of view we shall 
consider them as operations on sets. We shah do this using the obvious correspon- 
dence between formulae (ordered by implication) and sets (ordered by inclusion). 
In the sequel we shall consider (schemes of) functionals as syntactic expressions 
as well as semantic ones. The context will always exclude confusion. 
The following fact gives an alternative characterization of the connectives con- 
sidered in Fact 2.6, where T’(x) = x, and for ic o, p+‘(x) = r(r’(x)). 
Fact 2.1. For any first-order interpretarion I and valuation v of free variables the 
following conditions hold : 
(a) I,v kAi [lJ P]A i&there is i E o such fhat I,v kAL ri,_ .,,(fafse), 
(b) I,v Co,,,(P*)A iflthere is iE o such that I,v t,,,,, I&a(false), 
(c! 1,~ CT, A ztoext, ifl there is i E o such that I,v +_ rk.,...+(false). 
Fact 2.7 indicates that the Iogics we consider can be characterized by sets of 
(schemes oi) functionals defining their nonclassical connectives. Note also that 
connectives in logics of programs can usually be ordered by a well-founded relation. 
Such an ordering can usually be found in a natural way, e.g. can be given by the 
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syntax of programs. In wh.?t fol!ows we shah then ass’ume rc,: t&2 set M of 
nonclassical connectives is always suppiemented by a well-founded relation cM. 
The above discussion leads to the following definition. 
Definition 2.8. We say that set T(M) = {T,,,,,(x) I m E M, A E L(M)} defines set M 
of non-classical connectives of M-logic provided that the following conditions hold: 
(aj for any first-order interpretation I and vaiuation n of free variables, 
- I,n + m(A)~T,,,,(m(A)), 
- 1.0 I= m(A) iff there is i E w such that 1,~ I= f~,,,,(false); 
(b) there is a well-founded relation < &, on M such that right-hand sides of 
equalities defining functionals rmi,, E r(M), contain (syntacticahy) only 
connectives less (w.r.t. CM) than tn. 
Definition 2.8 is a basic one in further considerations. Let us note that the 
phenomenon that logics of programs are definable by sets of (schemes of) functionals 
we consider is rather general in logiis of programs. The reader can notice that there 
are some similarities between fix-point (or denotational) semantics of programs and 
the characterizaticn of ronclassical connectives given above. Namely, computation 
of, say, a loop consists of a sequence of smaller steps. The loop is then characterized 
as the supremum (or-in other words-the kast upper bound) of finite sequences 
each of which is a better approximation of the loop. A similar situation appears in 
the characterization of nonclassical connectives given abo?e. To m&e this more 
clear suppose @(P*) is a formula specifying a property of loop P8. The loop can 
be characterised as the least upper bound of its initial computation sequences, 
P* = ui,, Pi. Thus @(P*) = cP(&_ P’) and it is natural to demand that #(P*) = 
Vi,, ei(P’), for some well-defined formulae @?. Moreover, since the nest approxi- 
mation of P* can be computed from the previous one, the carmection between @, 
and @,+r should reflect this computation. In the case of our formnta~, in order to 
mirror this phenomenon, we used r’(false) as rP,. Yote also !hat the research on 
propositional p-calculus (cf. e.g. 183) shows other arguments that the class of logic; 
definable by the considered sets of functionais is a large one. 
Definition 2.9 
(a) Given an M-logic, we shall say that set M of nonclassical connectives is 
inonotone iff for any interpretation 1, m E .%f, and formulae Al 3, 
1 i= A+ B implies I != m(A)+ m(B). 
(b) Given an M-logic, we shall say that set r of functionals is monoro~:e iE for 
any interpretation I, functional GE r, and formulae A, E, 
ItA+B implies IC G(A)-,G(B). 
23x A. St0 hs 
Fact 2.10. Sers M,,,, Mw~, und M,C,IX (c/e$ined irr D+iifions 2.2(a), 2.3(a), (2.4) 
and 2.5(a)) are monotone. 
Proof. The proof can be carried out by easy verification. 0 
Fact 2.11. <fMis a mono!one set of norclassical conneclives, andris a xi af (schemes 
of) funckmals dejined hv wing connectives of M u {A, v} the,: I‘ is monolone. 
Proof. The easy proof can be carried out by structural induction on formulae 
ofr. ??
Definition 2.12. (a) By r,, we sha!l mean the following set of (schemes of) 
functionals: 
l;L:=,lA(xj=A(z/tj, I;P:Q&) =[PlIQlA 
~[~~(~,~~PBIA(x)=(~G-~A)~(G~IPIA), 
&j&x) = A v [Plx. 
By the relation Cam,, we shall mean the transitive closure of the smallest relation 
in which minimal elements take the form [z:= tl and which contains all pairs of 
the form ([PI, [P;Q]), ([Q].[P;Oj). ([P],[if G then Pfi]) and for all iE CO pairs of 
the form ([PI’, [LJ P]). 
(b) BY ~DL we shall mean the following set of (schemes of) function&: 
~+,a(~) = W/t), &?,A(x) = G F. A, 
&pia(xi =!P)(QM, I;P~Q,A(x) = (PM v (@A 
I+,, = A v (P)x. 
By the relation c,,,,,~ we shali mean the transitive closure of the smallest rela:io:? 
in which minimal elements take form (z := t), (G?) and which contains all pairs of 
the form ((PA (P;Q)), ((Q), (P;Q)), ((P), (Pu Q)), ((O), (Pu Q)) and for ali :E w 
pairs of the form ((I~)‘, (Pe)). 
(c) By r,,, we shall mean set Tar augmented with the follo+ng scheme of 
functionals: 
&o,,(x) = (PM A (QM 
By the relation <,,,_ we shall mean the relation <,,+,,~ augmented with the rule 
stating that pairs of the form ((P), (P n Q)), ((Q), (PA Q)). 
(d) By r,, we shall mean the following set of (schemes of) functionals: 
r ila,nex&) = (A A B) 11 v C-B AX) Il. 
By the relation cMT,, we shall mean the transitive closure of the smallest relation 
in which minimal elements take form atnext B, where B is a classical formula, and 
which contains pairs of the form (atnextB, atnext,), whenever B contains less 
occurieuces of atnext than C, where the respective nonclassical connectives are 
defined in Detinitions 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
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Note that most of the functionals defined in Definition 2.12 are constant func- 
tionals. 
Fact 2.13. Sets rAL, r,,,o, and r,, define AL, (C)DL and TL respectively. 
Proof. The proof can be carried out by using standard techniques and Definitions 
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.8 and 2.12. •! 
Fact 2.14. Sets r,,, r,,,,, and r,, are monotone. 
Proof. The proof follows immediate!v from Facts 2.10 and 2.11. G 
Let US note that another prcperty common to the considered logics is that their 
sets of nonclassical connectives are monotone. Similarly, all of those logics can be 
characterized by monotone sets of (schemes of) functionals. Moreover, the sets of 
functionals exactly mirror the respective definitions of satisfiab%ty relations. Let us 
conclude the discussion of this section with the following definition of logics 
considered in our paper. 
Definition 2.15. We shall say that M-logic is monotone i:? M is monotone and there 
is a monotone set r defining connectives of M. 
To indicate the fad that set M of non-classical connectives of monotone M-logic 
is definable by r we shall writs (M, r)-lo_o;c instead of M-logic. 
3. Strictly ari:lmetical interpret3tions 
Let us now discuss the class of admissible interpretations we consider in this 
paper. First, we assume that the s-arithmetical interpretation contains sort o of 
natural numbers together with constants 0, 1 and functions +, *. Next note that 
programmers deal with potentially infinite data types whose elements, however, are 
represented by finitistic means. Queues, stacks, arrays, trees, symbols, etc. are always 
finite. We shall formulate this condition as an assumption that for each sort there 
is a relation “encoding” its elements as natural numbers. 
Let us note that we do not consider finite interpretations, for o is infinite. On the 
other hand, finite interpretations are of great importance in the proof theory of 
logics of programs. The problem of logics of programs interpreted in finite relational 
structures has been discussed by many authors (cf. e.g. [6,16]) thus we shall not 
follow this point here. 
The following definition summarizes the discussion. 
Definition 3.1. A first-order interpretation I is called s-urilkmetical provided that 
(a) I contains the sort w of natural numbers together with constants 0, I and 
functions +, * interpreted as usual; 
(b) for each sort s of I there is an effective binary relation e, such that for each 
x of sort J there is exactly one i E w with e,(x, i) true in I. 
Let us remark here that because of the effectiveness of relation e, all sorts of I 
are effective (i.e. some natural kind of Turing computability is defined on sorts of 
I). Note also that the class cf s-arithmetical interpretations is a proper subclass of 
the arithmetical interpretations of Hare1 [S]. 
In order to simplify our considerations, in what follows we shall consider one- 
sorted s-arithmetical interpretations with sort o, operations 0, 1, +, * and additional 
functions having signature w + w. In the presence of encoding relations this can be 
done without loss of generality. Namely, functions and relations on sorts other than 
ti can be represented by functions with signature o + w or o + {0, I,‘, respectively. 
Let us now briefly discuss the notion of a partial recursive functional. Namely, 
by a F&a! recursive functional we shall mean any functional that, interpreted in 
an s-arithmetical interpretation, is partial recursive (perhaps relative to some oracle). 
That is to say, a functional r is partial recursive whenever for each formula n and 
xt given an oracle answering whether U(X) is true, the question whether T(a)(x) 
is true, is partial recursive. This notion of partial recursiveness is well known and 
its precise definition need not be quoted here. The definition of partial recursive 
functionals that best serves our purposes is to be found in the book of Hinman [:I_ 
Lemma 3.2 (on expressiveness). For any formula A of an (M, r)-logic, and 
s-arithmetical interpretation I, if functionals of r are partial recursive, then there is a 
classiealJirst-order formula A’ such that I != A c) A’. 
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on formuia A. If A is a classicai iirst-order 
formula there is nothing to prove. What remains to show is that, for any m E M and 
BE L(M), there exists formula C E L such that I C Co m(B). Considrr r,,,,,,. 
r m(Sj is monotone and partial recursive (by assumption). By Definition 2.8(a), m(B) 
is the least fixed point of r,,,,. By Theorem 3.5 in Hinman [7, p. si:; m(B) is 
partial recursive, thus first-order definable in the language we deal with. 0 
As a simple corollary of Lemma 3.2 and Facts 2.10, 2.13, 2.14 we obtain the fact 
that s-arithmetical interpretations are expressive for AL, (C)DL and TL. 
4. Axiomatizing monotone M-lo&s 
In this section we show a powerful technique of obtaining s-arithmetically com- 
plete and sound proof systems for monotone M-logics. The notion of proof systems 
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assumed in our paper is the standard one As usual, the symbol + stands for the 
syntactic consequence reiation. 
Definition 4.1. We say that a proof system P for X-iogic is s-arithmetically sound 
(complete) provided that, for any s-arithmetical interpretation I and any formula 
A E L(M), 
I%, t- A implies (is implied by) I + A 
where 77~ denotes the set of all classical first-order formulae valid in I. 
The above definition differs from the relative completeness of Cook [4] and the 
arithmetical completeness of Hare1 [5] in the class of admissible interpretations. 
Below we define proof systems for (ivl, rj-loqics and snow their s-arithmetical 
sotrndness and completeness. 
Definition 4.2. By proof system &M.,-l for (M, T)-logic we shall mean the proof 
system containing the following axioms and inference rules: 
(1) all instances of clzssical propositional tautologies; 
(2) for all m E A4 and formula A such that T,,,,(x) is a constant functional 
(syntactically, i.e. a functional containing no occurrences of s) we assume the 
foilowing axiom: 
(LR) kl,~~.~-, m(A)@r,,,,!faise); 
(3) for all m E M other than those in (21 we assume the following inference rides:: 
(L) r,,,,(C)+C, C-R i-<.\r.~-, m(A)+& 
(R) B+SC(n), C(n+l)-tT,,,,(C(n)),,C(Oj !--,>,,r) B+m(A) 
where n is a variable not appearing in m(A); 
(4) rules: 
(MP) A,A+B +,Au: 5, 
(M) A+B F,~,.~., m(A)-bm(B). 
Note that the distinction between cases (2) and (3j is not essential. fn fact, we 
could consider case (3) only, a particular case of which is case (2). However, we 
make the distinction in order to obtain more elegant proof systems. Definition 2.12 
shows that constant fmctionais appear freqnently in logics of programs. 
Proof. Cases (1) and (MP) are obvious. Soundness of (Mj follows from monotonic- 
ity of It4. What remains to be shown is that rules (L) and (R) are sound (axiom 
(LR), as a particular case of rules (L) and (R), needs no separate proof). 
Assume the premises or rule (I..) are true in interpretation I. We shall show that, 
for all i E O, I I= I’f,,,,,,(false) -) B. We proceed by induction on i. The case of i = 0 
is trivial. Assume that Ii= r’ ,,,cA,(false)+ C. Thus, by monotonicity of r, 
I r= I’:,Gl)(r‘&,AI )+ I’,,,,, ,,(C), and so. since I + 1D,,,,,(C)+ C, by transitivity of + 
we obtain I I= I”+’ ,,I,,,(faise)+ C. Now to prove (Lj it &ices to use Definition 2.8(a). 
Assume the premises of rule (R) are true in interpretation I. We shall show that, 
for all ioo, 2 + C(i)-trb(,+ (false). We proceed by induction on i. The case i = 0 
is trivial, for formula C(O)+ P .,(&false) is just the last of premises. Assume 
I C C(i)+rk,,,,(false). Thus, by monotonicity of r, I C I’,,,,,,(C(ij)+ 
~L~a,(Tb~la,(false)j. F rom the second premise of (Rj we have I C C(i+ 1) + 
I’,,,,,,(C(i)), thus, by transitivity of +, I C C(i+ l)+ r$~,(false). From the first 
premise of (R), I ir B-, 3nC(nj. Thus, by Definition 2.8(a), we obtain the desired 
result. 0 
Lemma 4.4. For any (M, r)-bgic, any formula A of the logic, any classical formula 
B and any s-arithmetical interpretation I, iffunctionals ofr are partial recursive, then 
I t= A-B impliex Tfl, +.(M.rb A++ B. 
Proof. First we shall show, that Th, L ,M,,.I A-B, where A takes the form m(D) 
for a classical first-order formula D. We proceed by induction on relation cM. The 
case of minimal connectives (w.r.t. cnr) is similar to that of- the induction step. 
Thus we present both proofs together. 
By the proof of Theorem 3.5 in Hinman [7, p. 921 (with 2 slight adaptation to 
our formalism), there is a primitive recursive function f and a recursive relation T 
such that, for all n E w, 
I i r~,o,(false)~3uT(f(n+ l), z, u) 
(the vector z represents the free variables of m(D)). Denote by C(n, z) the formula 
3uT(f(n+l), z, u). Obviously, by Definition 2.8(a), I + m(D)++qnC(n, z). 
Now we show that 7%) E,,,,,~, Bc*m(Dj. 
Observe that I t B+ m(D) implies I I= B-t 3nC(n, z). Moreover, since 
1 b C(a+l, z)~r~~,;b,(falsr)~r,~~(~~,~~~(false))~~~,~,(C(~, z)), we have 
that Ii= C(n+lj+r,,,,(C(n, I)). Clearly, I C lC(O, z). Since B+3nC(n, z) and 
lC(O, z) are classical first-order formulae, 771, F,~.,., B+ 3nC(n, z) and 
‘fir %qr? lC(O, z). By Definition 2.8(b), I’,,,,,J,(C(n, z)) contains neither the non- 
classical connective m nor those greater than m. Thus the case when m is minimai 
is proved, for r,,,,,,(C(n, z)) is then simply a classical formula. In the case of the 
induction step we use here inductive assumption in order to obtain Th, r-CM,,.) C(n + 
1, z)+r,,,,,,(C(n, z)j. Note that usually r,,,, (C(n, z)) is not of the form m’(D’). 
In such a case we use inductive assumption and the procedure of eliminating 
nonclassical connectives described at the end of this proof, in order to prove 
equivalence between T,,,,,(C(n, zj) and some classical formula. Now, applying 
rule(R), we obtain Th, F,~.~,B-,~(D), i.e. T/I, t-,M,r,B+A. 
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Next let us show that 771, t,,,,., m(D)+ 6. Consider formula C(z) defined as 
3nc:n, z), where C(n, z) is defined above. Since, by Definition 2.8(a), 
Z~Zl~~,n!(m(D))~m(D), and by monotonicity of Z, we conclude 
Z I= Z,,,,,,(C(z))+ C(z). By classical propositional reasoning we obtain Z C C(z)- 
B. Since C(z) is a classical formula, by Definition 2.8, Z,,,r,,(C(z)) contains only 
nonclassical connectives less than M. From the inductive assumption we thus have 
2% i-_(MJ., Z”,,,, (C(z))- C(z). Since C(z)+B is a classical formula, 
TIr, icM,,., C(z)+ B. Now, applying rule (L) we obtain 7%; i,n,,z i . . . . L ; iv’ r)l+ B, i.e. 
% ??(M.I.) A+ B. 
Summing up, we proved 771, tc,,.,-, A-B for A of the form m(D). 
Now, if A is more complex than m(D), we can eliminate all occurrences of 
nonclassical connectives, starting from innermost ones, by p:oving their equivalence 
to respective first-order formulae and then substituting the former by the latter. By 
Lemma 3.2 ihis can always be done. Such a procedure results in equivalent classical 
first-order formula. ??
Theorem 4.5. For any (M, r)-logic, [f dl funcfiwds of r are pnrfiai recursive, then 
proof system c_,r; is s-arithmetically compiete. 
Proof. We need to show that Z C A implies 771, t, r,.l‘, A, where Z is an s-arithmetical 
interpretation. We proceed by structural induction on A. 7he case when A is a 
classical first-order formula is obvious. 
Assume A is not classical. By Lemma 3.2 there is a classical first-order formula 
A’ such that I C A-A’. From Lemma 4.4 we have Th, t5 ..,_r-r AHA’. Obviously, 
since Z k A, Z k A’ thus A’E 7-h,, and so Th, t,.,,.I.I A’. Now by classicat proposi- 
tional reasoning we obtain Th, I,,~,,,-) A. 12 
5. Examples of applications 
In this section we show new axiomatizations of AL, (C)DL and TL. The theorems 
given below immediately follow from Theorems 4.3, 4.5, Facts 2.13, 2.14 anti the 
simple observation that functionals defining nonciassicat connectives are partial 
recursive (perhaps relatively to finite parts of first-order theories of respective 
s-arl?hmetical interpretations). 
Theorem 5.1. The following proof qatem for AL is s-orithme?ical!v sound and complete 
(1 j a!! ins!nnres qi classical propositional tautologies, 
(2) +,, [z:= t]AeA(z/tj where A is an open formula, 
(3) +ALIP;QIA-[~‘IIQIA, 
(4) +.&if G theoPfi)At,(lG-zA)~(Gj[P]A), 
(5) (Av[P]C)+C, C+BE,,[UP]A-,B, 
Theorem 5.2. The jollowing proqf system for (C)DL is s-clrirhmeticalJ.v sound and 
complete: 
(I ) all kslances of classical proposilional tautologies, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
I-,~,,,,_ (z := t)A ++ A(z/ f) where A is at: cpcn formula, 
+,,,,,(G?)A~G~A, 
~,T,DL(P;Q)A~(P)(Q)A, 
i-o,,, (Pu QM++(P)A v (C)A, 
~cuL(P~Q)A~(P)AA(Q)A, 
(A v (PjC,+ C: C-, B t-,C)DL (P*)A-+ B, 
B+3nC(n), C(n+l)+(Av(P)C(n)), lC(O) t(cjDLB+(P*)A where n 
does not appear in (P*)A, 
A,A+ B +IC)DL B, 
Theorem 53. Thefoilowingproof system for TL is s-arithmetically sound and complete: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
all instances of classical proposirional tautologies, 
((AAB) 1 lv(~.!?~C) jl)+C, C+D+,,Aatnext,+D, 
D+3nC(n), C(n tl)-,((AAB) 1 lv(~BnC(n)) 1 l), TC(O)~-~~D+A 
atnext, where n does not appear in A atnexiB, 
A,A + B I--T~ B, 
A + B t,, A atnext, + B atnext,. 
Note that rules U(5), 5.2(7) and 5.3(2) can be reformulated (by ciassica; proposi- 
tional reasoning) as follows: 
5.2(S) A-,C,[P]C-tC,C+i?t--,,[LJP]A-+B, 
5.2(7’) A+C,(P)C+C,C+BF--,,(P*)A+B, 
5.3(2’) (AAB) 1 l+c,(lB~C) 1 l+C,C+DtTIAatnextg+D. 
Thus the above rules can be considered as ruies for “backward” invariants. 
Note that in the case of temporai logic we introduced some auxiliary symbols 
like 11, cv. in order to make our approach applicable to this logic. On the other 
hand, the auxiliary operator 11 means exactly the same as nexttime operator 0 of 
“pure” temporal logic (defined as atnex& in terms of the language we &al with). 
Constants cq correspond to +a .,mporal terms of the form Oizj. Thus one can easily 
eliminate :he auxiky symbols from proof system obtained in Theorem 5.3 and 
formulate the system in terms of “pure” temporal logic. 
I would like to thank the anonymous referees for contributing helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
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